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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CAROL JOAN STONE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

10698

VAL FRANKLIN STONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to modify the terms of a
divorce decree and to award the custody of the four
minor children to the father on the grounds that
the mother is mentally incompetent and is otherwise
unfit to care for them; and on the further grounds
that the two oldest children, both over ten years
of age, expressed a desire to live with their father.
These proceedings also involve a motion pursuant
to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
1

have the mother of the mmor children submit to
a mental examination before a disinterested psychiatrist. (Tr. 13)
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson found
against the appellant on all issues.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
For the Supreme Court to reverse the decision
of the trial judge on all issues, and to award the
custody of all four children to their father.

1

!

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is one of first impression in the State
of Utah and involves substantial rights of parents
and minor children. It also brings before the court '
the issue of whether Anderson v. Anderson, 110
Utah 300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946), has been modified
by Smith v. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, P. 2d 900
( 1963) ; and if it has not, then this instant case
seeks clarification of the Anderson case as it pertains to children over ten years of age.
!

The parties herein were divorced in a decree
signed on July 21, 1964, by the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, the same judge who presided at the
2

trial in the lower court in the instant case. (Tr.
5-6) At that time, the trial court awarded the care,
custody, and control of the four minor children to
the mother, the respondent herein. (Tr. 5) The
children are all boys, and their names and ages at
the time of the hearing in June of 1966 were as
follows: Randall, born October 24, 1953, age 12;
Richard, born March 13, 1955, age 11; Bret and
Bart, born January 11, 1959, age 7. (Tr. 7). The
father was ordered to pay $240.00 per month as
alimony and child support (Tr. 8); and the record
discloses that these payments were promptly made
each and every rnon th. (Tr. 108) . In addition to
these payments, the father spent time at the former
residence assisting in taking care of the children
when needed, and helping around the house and
yard. (Tr. 108, 175).
In April, 1965, the father remarried. His new
wife Lynell had three children from a previous
marriage, two girls and one boy. The ages for the
two girls were 13 and 7 and the boy was 9 at the
time of the proceedings in the instant case. (Tr.
87-88). Their ages were about the same as the four
minor children involved in this action, whose ages
were 12, 11, and 7.
The record shows that the respondent had a
nervous breakdown during 1958-1960 and had not
been able to take care of the children. (Tr. 118,
Line 21 - Tr. 124; Tr. 131, Lines 9 et seq.). She
had moved from her old neighborhood because she

felt that the neighbol'S we1·e spying on her. (Tr. 119,
Lines 8-18). After moving in to the new home, hel'
condition worsened and she claimed that she had a
tape recorder embedded into the back of her head
which was recording what she was thinking, that
her telephone had been tapped and people were spying on her; and that people were parked in cars
watching her. (Tr. 120) In 1960 she went into the
hospital for shock treatments (Tr. 120-121). The
first of these did not help but after a little time she
improved and by the time of the divorce in 1964
was sufficiently better so the father decided not
to contest the custody of the children. (Tr. 121). ,
r

Matters remained in this state until after the
remarriage of the father in the summer of 1965
when the old symptoms reappeared (Tr. 121, Lines
12-15). The mother began complaining of headaches '
again and said she felt that people were spying
on her. (Tr. 121, Lines 14-25). She thought the
neighbors again were against her and she became
very depressed. She told her husband that she
thought she had a tape recorder in her head about
the first part of 1966 which was some five or six
months after the first symptoms appeared (Tr. 122,
Lines 1-2). During this time she was unable to recognize her children. Her statements to her husband
about this are as follows:
1

"Q
A

Did she ever tell you Mr. Stone that she
did not recognize her children?
Yes sir. She has told me occasionally on
4

1

several occasions that she just no longer
could recognize the children all the time.
Q And when would these be, and what would
be the circumstances?
A Well, one time in particular was a Saturday morning. I went out to pick up the
children, and she just said, 'Well, you can
take these children, but I don't think
these little ones are mine.' She said the
other day, 'I am sure they sent home the
wrong children from school and I was
just about to send them back and one
of my neighbors convinced me that they
were my children so I let them stay
here.'" (Tr. 122, Lines 3-16.)
One of the mother's neighbors who lived just across
the street, and who had been in the mother's home
several times testified that the mother told her that
she didn't believe the younger twins were hers. This
situation occurred in January of 1966, and as stated
by the witness was as follows:
"Q Has Mrs. Stone ever told you that she
didn't believe that the two youngest
children, the twins, were hers?
A Yes, she did.
Q And can you tell us about that situation,
please?
A Well, at the time she said she was very
upset. I don't know what caused the situation to come about.
Q When was this Mrs. Close?
A This was about the 5th of January.
5

Q

Of this year?

A

Of this year.

Q

All right, what happened then'!
I had been over visiting with Carol and l
was just helping and visiting with her,
and I left about 1 :30 that afternoon, the
children, I don't know if they were home
from school, or what the deal was, but I
had to go home, and she had gone over
to visit with another neighbor, and she
was quite upset and the neighbor had
called me over because I had been with
Carol that day.
Who was the neighbor, Mrs. Close?
Mrs. Lavon Marler. And the children
were in primary and I really don't remember everything that happened except
that she was worried about the twins.
Who was worried about the twins?
Carol was worried about the twins. They
were in primary, and she wanted to make
sure they were there, and she was upset,
and I said 'I will take you over', so I
took her over to primary and got the
twins and brought them out to my car,
and she just didn't think they were her
children.
What did she say to you?
She asked me if I thought the twins were
hers, and I said, 'Of course they are
yours,' and I tried to reassure her t~at
they were hers, and I told her the twms
knew me, and that if they didn't know

A

Q
A

Q

A

Q

A

6

me I was quite sure that they would not
get into my car or come with me when I
got them out.
Q Did she say this in the presence of the
two twins?
A Yes, she did. (Tr. 153-155)
This witness went on to testify that the mother
told her that she felt that some of the people in the
neighborhood were against her and that she thought
there was a tape recorder set up in her house or a
microphone and that the things she did and said
were being recorded. (Tr. 156). None of this testimony of either the father or the neighbors was denied or controverted by the mother who did not take
the stand nor offer any witnesses.
The record discloses that the mother would
just sit and stare and would become very depressed
and moody. (Tr. 156-157) The mother stated to the
father and to several neighbors that the two oldest
boys were too much for her to handle; that she
couldn't discipline them and that she felt that they
should be living with their father (Tr. 126, 152-153;
181-182) The neighbors became so concerned about
the mother's depression and neglect in the home that
they went to the mother's bishop and asked him
to go to talk to her. (Tr. 157, 164, 180). Her illness
persisted from the summer of 1965 to later than
April, 1966. (Tr. 121, Lines 14-15; Tr. 183, 184)
During this time, the mother was under the
care of Jack L. Tedrow, M.D., with offices at 975
7

East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Tedrow
was a physician and surgeon specializing in psychiatry, (Tr. 187). He stated that he had seen the
mother continuously since her nervous breakdown
in 1960 averaging several visits a year and that
the last time he had seen her was on January 14,
1966. (Tr. 199). Dr. Tedrow stated that he felt
the mother was suffering from a mental illness
known as schizophrenia (Tr. 191-192), and recommended she be hospitalized in the LDS hospital psychiatric ward for further examination. (Tr. 125126) The mother called the father and asked him
if he would take the children while she went into
the hospital to which he readily agreed. (Tr. 125126)
The appellant testified that the mother's symptoms were the same from the summer of 1965
through April of 1966, as those exhibited in 1960
during her first nervous breakdown. He stated that
he did not think that she was capable of taking care
of the children or her house during these times.
(Tr. 131) The father stated that just a few weeks
prior to the time of the trial in June 1966, when he
returned the children to their mother that her eyes
were glassy and had kind of a fixed stare expression. He noticed that her hair had not been combed
and that her body was shaking. She appeared to be
extremely nervous (Tr. 130-131). He further stated
that during the time shortly before and after these
proceedings were commenced that the children were
8

neglected in the house, that the house was a mess,
that food was spilled in the rooms, that the children
were never clean, that he and his present wife
had to bathe the children when they took them on
Saturdays for visitation, and that they had to wash
their clothes and feed them breakfast even though
they were not picked up until about 9 :30 in the
morning. (Tr. 118, 139).
For some reason, the mother decided against
going into the hospital. It was this decision that precipitated the present lawsuit which was commenced
March 31, 1966. (Tr. 12-15) At the first hearing
held on Friday, April 8, 1966, the mother's attorney
stated that he was not ready to hear this matter
and asked for a continuance. This was objected to
by the father's counsel on the grounds that a hazard
existed in the mother's home and that it would be
detrimental to the children to allow them to remain
in the home any longer while the mother was in her
present mental state. The trial judge, JOSEPH G.
JEPPSON, overruled this objection, continued the
matter in all aspects and sent the case to pretrial.
Judge Leonard W. Elton held the pretrial on
May 5, 1966, and based upon the representation of
the mother's counsel, that he could not be ready for
trial before a certain date, the case was set for a two
clay trial before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
beginning June 14, 1966. (Tr. 35).
The pre-trial judge formulated the issues as
follows:
9

" ( 1) Whether the plaintiff is mentally incompetent to take care of the four minol'
children.
(2) Whether the plain tiff is otherwise unfit
to take care of the four minor children.
(3) vVhether pursuant to Rule 35 of the :
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is
sufficient cause for the plaintiff to submit to psychiatric, physical examination.
(4) Should the court decide the plaintiff
should be examined by a disinterested
impartial physician the examining physician will be entitled to all medical records pertaining to the person being examined. Counsel for the plaintiff objects to the furnishing of all medical
records, which objection was overruled.
(5) Whether the plaintiff is in contempt of
the divorce decree heretofore entered in
this matter for her failure to grant the
defendant reasonable visitation rights
with respect to the four children.
(6) After the issue of custody is decided
then the trial court should decide the
issue of what are reasonable visitation
rights. (Tr. 36)
(7)

(8)

*

*

*

Whether the four minor children or any
of them will select the defendant as the
parent with whom they wish to reside
permanently.
If any child does so select the defend ant,
whether that decision is binding on the
10

trial court as to which parent should
have custody of that child (Tr. 38-39).
The court then added five more issues for the plaintiff as follows:
( 1)

Whether the defendant is mentally incompetent to take care of the four minor
children.

(2)

Whether the defendant is otherwise unfit to take care of the four minor children.

(3)

Whether pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, there is
sufficient cause for the defendant to
submit to psychiatric and physical examination.

(4)

Whether or not the defendant has established a suitable home with his new
wife and whether his present wife is a
suitable person to have these children.
(5) Whether the plaintiff's counsel is entitled to attorneys fees and the amount
thereof in defense of this action. (Tr.
37).
The first four issues raised by the mother were decided against her by her own stipulation in court.
This stipulation was to the effect that the father
and his present wife were capable in all respects to
care for the minor children. This stipulation was
made in open court and was recorded in the trial
record as follows :
"THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT HE
11

(plaintiff's counsel) HAS STIPULATED
THAT BOTH HE (the defendant) AND HIS
WIFE ARE FIT AND PROPER AND MORAL PERSONS AND PROPER PERSONS
TO RAISE THE CHILDREN." (Tr. 202 ,
Lines 20-22)
'
This stipulation made it unnecessary to ca11 character witnesses who were present in court and ready
to testify. (Tr. 202).
At the trial, the defendant called the father,
his present wife, four neighbors of the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff's psychiatrist as a hostile witness.
Character witnesses were present but were not
needed because of the stipulation cited above. The
father then rested.
The mother did not take the stand, nor did she
offer any witnesses in her behalf, nor did she offer
any evidence to rebut the statements made by the
father's witnesses as set forth above in this statement off acts.
The trial judge then ordered the children to be
present the next day. That night the mother's attorney called the mother and the two oldest children
into his office for a "brainwashing" session. What
occurred at that meeting is described by the oldest
boy Randall to the trial judge as follows:
"Q
A
Q

You have never talked to your mother's
attorney?
Yes.
When did you talk to him?
12

A
Q
A

Yesterday night.
What did you tell him?
Well, he talked to me about school and
that.

Did he tell you what to say down here?
Today? unh unh.
Q Just tell me what you remember him
telling you?
A I remember him telling me that my mommy needs me and knowing that I should
stay where I live. I guess that is what
he said. And he said, 'I think that you
will stay where you are.'" (Tr. 214215)
In spite of this attempt, the two oldest boys told
the trial judge they would rather live with their
father than with their mother and gave their reasons for so deciding. (Tr. 210, Lines 14-20; Tr. 212,
Lines 12-14; Tr. 217, lines 1-13).
Q
A

The court then issued its memorandum decision
finding against the father on all issues. (Tr. 46-47,
51) Counsel for the mother then submitted his proposed "Finding of Fact," Conclusions of Law, and a
Decree (Tr. 54-59) to which written objections were
filed on several grounds. (Tr. 60-63). The father
also made an offer of proof that if the mother's psychiatrist had been permitted to testify about the
mother's mental condition, (The Doctor-patient privilege had been invoked by the mother and sustained
by the trial judge) he would have said the mother
13

was mentally incompetent to take care of the four i
minor children and that in his opinion the mother
should be required to submit to further psychiatric
examination and should be hospitalized for further
treatment because of her condition. He would further
testify that her condition was not good for the welfare of the minor children and that it would have an
adverse effect upon their said welfare (Tr. 62-63).
A hearing was had on the said objections and motion
after which the trial judge signed the Findings,
Conclusions, and Decree and refused to allow the
offer of proof.
I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
CUSTODY OF THE TWO OLDEST BOYS TO THEIR
FATHER, BECAUSE THESE BOYS WERE OVER THE
AGE OF TEN YEARS AND BECAUSE THESE BOYS
HAD STATED TO THEIR FATHER AND TO THE
TRIAL JUDGE THAT THEY WANTED TO LIVE WITH
THEIR FATHER.

The trial judge stated in his memorandum
decision as follows:
" ( 4) The court is of the opinion that even
though the two oldest children expressed a desire to be with their father, that expression is
not binding upon this court. This court is of
the opinion that the case of Smith vs. Smith in
15 Utah 2d does not apply to this case, and
that the court is governed by the case of Anderson v. Anderson found in 110 Utah." (Tr.
46)
14

The oldest boy, Randall, age 12, made the
following statement to the trial judge about who
he wanted to live with and why:
"Q Has your daddy ever asked you to come
and live with him?
A Yes.
Q And what did you tell him?
A I told him I wanted to.
Q You told him that you wanted to go and
live with him?
A Yes.
Q Did he promise you anything when he
asked you to come and live with him?
A No.
Q He didn't promise you a bike, or a pony
or fishing trips or anything?
A No." (Tr. 210)
"Q
A

Q
A

Q
A

Q

A

*

*

*

And what has your father ever said
about your mother?
I haven't heard him say anything.
He has never said anything about her.
I've never heard him.
But you say that you would rather live
with your father than your mother?
Yes.
Tell me why.
Well, because I haven't seen my father
15

for so long and I want to see him." (Tr.
212)
This minor child, Randall, then went on to state
that he knew his father's present wife's three children and wanted to have them as his brothers and
sisters (Tr. 213)
The trial judge's questions to the minor child
Ricky, age 11, were as follows:
"Q
A
Q

A
Q

A
Q
A

Do you want to spend more time with
your father?
Yes.
How much more time? You tell me.
Would you like to go and live with your
father?
Yes.
Rather than your mother? And why?
You've got to help me Ricky, you've got
to tell me. Has your father ever told you
that he would like to have you come and
live with him?
Yes.
Have you told him that you would like
to go live with him?
Yes." (Tr. 217)

This child also said that he would like to have the
defendant's present wife's three children as his
brothers and sisters. (Tr. 219)
The record further discloses that these two
oldest boys had also told their father shortly after
16

the proceedings had commenced that they wanted to
come and live with him. The father's testimony in
this regard and which is not disputed by the mother
is as follows:
"Q

Have your children or any of them ever
told you that they wanted to come and
live with you and Lynell in the house.

A

Yes sir, my two oldest sons have expressed that desire.

Q Who are they?
A

Randall Stone and Richard Stone.

Q Can you tell us when it was that they expressed this desire and where it was and
what was said?

A

Q
A
Q
A

Q

A

Q
A

I was made aware of this whole situation
the first part of this year when we ha~
two visits with the bishop, with Carol's
bishop in our home.
Let me ask you what the children said to
you.
The children?
Yes.
They said they would rather come up and
live with me than where they are now
living.
When was this Mr. Stone?
It has been in the last two months.
In the last two months?
Yes.
17

Did they say that to you prior to the time
that the proceedings were started?
A No sir, they didn't tell me before we started proceedings.
Q Did you ever talk to the children and tell
them how they should testify before the
judge?
A No sir, I haven't." (Tr. 116)
On cross-examination the father clarified this conversation with his two oldest children.
Q

"Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q

A

Q
A
Q

(By Mr. Schaerrer) Now in regard to
these children telling you that they wanted to come and live with you.
Yes sir.
Your testimony was that they never told
you that until you started these proceedings, is that correct?
Yes sir, that is correct.
Didn't you go to them and tell them that
they should make up their minds if they
wanted to come and live with you.
No sir, not until after the proceedings
were started.
But then you told them that?
I asked the two older boys who they would
like to live with.
And did they tell you that?
Did they tell me what?
Did they tell me who they wanted to live
with?
18

A

Yes sir, they have.

How much longer, how many. When you
told them to make up their minds, how
long did it take them to answer that
question?
A Randall, it took him from one week.
Q And you were having several talks with
him during this period of time?
A No, sir; just from Saturday to Saturday
is all. I told him not to make up his mind
immediately because I knew it was a
serious decision and that I would like
him to make it, and if he possibly could
to make a decision.
Q And you told him you would like him to
come and live with you?
A I reminded him how much I did love him,
and yes, I wanted him to come and live
with me." (Tr. 143)
These two oldest boys obviously felt the same way
at the time of the trial some two months later. They
both told the trial judge they wanted to spend more
time with their father and wanted to come and live
with him rather than their mother. The reason for
this was that they did not get the opportunity to
see their father enough. They both stated that they
loved their father's present wife and would like to
have her children as their brothers and sisters. Their
testimony to the trial judge was that there were
no lures held out to help them make this decision
and it is obvious from the quotation above that this
Q

19

decision represents their considered judgment. (Tr.
210,212,213,217)
In this regard, the defendant would like to
point out that after the first day of the trial, the
attorney for the mother called the two oldest boys
into his office where together with their mother
the two oldest boys were subjected to a brain washing session. (Tr. 214-215) This was shortly after the
mother's attorney told the trial judge that he objected to the children being examined because he
"didn't then think there was evidence enough
to justify the traumatic experience this is
going to be for the children to come into the
courtroom here and elect one or the other parent." (Tr. 207)
Apparently he felt the session in his office was to
be a therapeutic balm for the boys' emotional well
being. Whatever virtuous motive might have precipitated this session, the appellant submits that it
was improper and extremely unfair, and probably
generated more anxiety in the boys than anything
else could have done.
Notwithstanding this eleventh hour session, the
boys still told the trial judge the next day they
wanted to live with their father rather than their
mother and gave some very mature reasons for domg so.
The trial judge apparently ignored these requests of the children and seems to had already made
20

up his mind that the mother was to have custody.
This might have been because it was the same judge
who had heard the earlier divorce decree in which
he had granted the custody of the children to the
mother. (Tr. 109, Lines 1-5) In addition to that
fact, the father submits there are at least two other
portions of the record that support his conclusion
that the trial judge had erroneously made up his
mind about the case before it ever got started.
The first instance occurred during the court's
opening remarks to counsel, as found on page 71
of the transcript, as follows:
"MR. McINTOSH: May I make an opening
statement?
THE COURT: No, let's get going. I have read
all this.
MR. McINTOSH: I would like to cite one case.
THE COURT: Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah
(2d).
MR. McINTOSH: In addition there is the case
of Holder vs. Holder in
1959 Utah (This is a reporter's error, the case
should be Bowler v. Bowler,
96 N.W. 2d 129 (1959).)
This, we think is on all 4's
with this proceedings.
THE COURT: You'd better read Anderson v.
Anderson which has not been
revised by the S11iith case."
21

Again at the end of the trial and when the court
ordered the four minor children to be present for
examination the next day, the attorney for the
mother objected to this on the ground that it would
be a traumatic experience for the children. The
Court said, "I am going to permit them to come in,
I have got my oiun idea of what the law is and then
we can argue the law after." (Tr. 207) The appellant submits that it is obvious from the statements of the trial judge that he felt the mother
should get these children and that the consent of
the children or their wishes and desires had no
weight whatsoever. The trial judge obviously had
his own idea of what the law should be and he
wasn't going to let the children persuade him otherwise. It's obvious that the only reason he gave the
father the courtesy of talking to the children was because the father submitted thirty-four written questions for the trial judge to ask the children (Tr. 4245) After hearing these comments by the trial judge,
it was no surprise to the father when the court stated in its memorandum decision that he believed the
wishes and desires of the minor children were not
controlling and that he felt that the Anderson v.
Anderson case was binding. The defendant submits
that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the
Anderson holding and that paragraph 4 of his
memorandum decision is contrary to law and to
the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court.
Even assuming for the purpose of this argu22

ment that the Ande?'Son case has not been modified
by later decisions, the appellant submits that the
trial judge has not properly interpreted the court's
holding in Anderson insofar as the decisions and
wishes of minor children over the age of ten years is
concerned. The appellant further submits the Anderson case is authority for his request for a change
of custody. Anderson was a proceeding exactly like
the instant case - that is, it was a request by the
father to modify an earlier divorce decree and to
award custody of a son to the father on the grounds
that the son had reached ten years of age and had
expressed a desire to be with the father. The court
granted the father's motion for a change of custody, and although it held that the decision of the
child was not absolutely binding upon the court,
it went on to state:
"In so holding, however, we do not mean that
the choice of the child who has reached such
an age and evidenced such intelligence as to
appreciate the importance of his decision,
should not be given due weight by the court
in considering the question of change of custody. On the contrary, such choice, and the
reasons, if any, advanced therefore, should be
given careful consideration. If it be evident
that the choice is not made because of some
temporary dissatisfaction or a passing whim
and is not dictated by some present lure, but
is a considered judgment of the child, it may
well be controlling in the determination of
what is for the best interest of the child."
23

(Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300 305
172p2d132 (1946) ).
'
'
It is not suggested by the trial judge anywhere in his Memorandum Decision, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Decree that the choice
of these two oldest boys was a mere whim or a passing fancy. As a matter of fact, the writer of this
brief will represent to this court that the trial
judge told him personally that their decision was
not a mere whim or passing fancy. Moreover, the
boys themselves told the trial judge that there was
no "present lure" offered them in their decision;
and the record discloses that the decision was their
"considered judgment" and not anything else. The
record overwhelmingly shows that the decision of
these boys was made after mature deliberation and
remained unchanged for two months notwithstanding a "brain washing" session in the office of the
respondent's attorney just before corning to court.
Consequently, the appellant submits that it was prejudicial and reversible error for the trial judge to
close his eyes to the request of these minor children
under the circumstances of this case. The defendant
further submits that the rationale of the Anderson
case dictates that the custody of the two older children should be awarded to the father

Since Anderson was decided, the Supreme Court
has had occasion to decide Sniith v. Smith, 15 Utah
2d 36, 386 P 2d 900 ( 1963). In Smith the court
held that a child who has reached the age of ten
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years or more may select the parent to which he
will attach himself and the court must grant custody of that child to that parent unless it is shown
that the parent is unfit to have custody.
It was stipulated by counsel for the mother;

and the trial court expressly found that the father
and his present wife were "fit, proper and moral
persons and proper persons to raise the children."
(Tr. 202) Consequently, the only issue before this
court is whether the decision of the two oldest
children is binding upon the court as held in Smith
v. S11iith and as suggested in Anderson v. Anderson
or whether it can be completely ignored as it was in
the instant case.
The appellant admits that the Smith holding
dealt with an original divorce action; whereas the
Anderson case involved a subsequent modification
proceeding much like the instant case. However,
the appellant respectfully submits that Anderson also
held the decision of the child was to be controlling
if it was a considered judgment rather than a mere
whim or passing fancy. If the Court disagrees with
this interpretation, then the father respectfully requests the Court to interpret its holding in Anderson and hold that the desire of a child over the age
of ten years is binding on the court in a modification proceedings just as it is in an original divorce
action or as a minimum alternative that it is binding under the circumstances in this case.
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Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated reads as follows :

1953

"Disposition of property and children: When
a decree of divorce is made the court may
make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of
the children and parties as may be equitable;
provided that if any of the children obtain
the age of 10 years and are of sound mind,
such children shall have the privilege of selecting the parent to which they will attach themselves. Such subsequent changes or new orders
may be made by the court with respect to the
disposal of the children or the distribution
of property as shall be reasonable and proper."
The father submits that there is nothing in the
language cited above to show a legislative intent to
allow a ten year old child the privilege to select his
own parents in a divorce proceeding but deny him
that right in a subsequent proceeding commenced
to modify the earlier decree. The father submits
there is no rationale to justify such a result and
that it is unworkable in domestic relations cases.
If a boy younger than ten needs a mother because of
the tender, loving care and attention she can give;
he needs it as much in the modification proceedings
as in the original divorce. Similarily, if a boy older
than ten needs a father becouse of the added discipline problems and because of the need to prepare for
education and business, doesn't it follow that he
needs this same parent in the modification proceed26

ings as much as he does in the original divorce
action? Why should he be given the right to select
the parent in the one case but not the other? The
father submits that the legislature emphasized the
age separation as being controlling and not the
forum in which the action happens to be brought.
The father submits that the age is controlling regardless of when the action is commenced and that
a more uniform result in this area can be achieved
by holding that the desire of the youngster over
ten years of age is controlling on the court in both
the original divorce as held in Smith v. Smith as well
as in a subsequent modification proceeding.
The father submits the court should interpret
Anderson v. Anderson to mean that a child over
the age of ten has the absolute right to select the
parent to which he will attach himself to and that
this decision is binding upon the trial court in modification hearings the same as it has been held to be
binding upon the trial court in divorce proceedings.
As a minimum alternative, the defendant requests
the court to hold that Anderson v. Anderson should
be interpreted to award custody of the two oldest
boys to their father under the circumstances of
this case because their decision is obviously
the result of mature deliberation and reflects
their considered judgment and is not a passing fancy. It seems astonishing that this considered,
deliberate judgment could be completely ignored
by the trial judge. If their feeling was as strong as
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it is expressed in the record herein, then it is very
likely that these children are either going to run
away from home to be with their father or else
they are going to end up before the court in a future
criminal proceedings. The request which the appellant is making to this court is made in all fairness
to avoid these situations in the future.
In addition to the considered judgment of the
oldest children, there is also the uncon troverted
evidence by the father and by the mother's own
neighbors that she was unable to take care of and
adequately discipline the two oldest children. In this
regard, the record shows that she told the witnesses
that she was unable to take care of the two older
boys and that she thought they would be better off
with the appellant. (Tr. 126, 152, 153, 181, 182)
The mother did not take the stand to rebut any of
this testimony and the appellant submits that this
evidence preponderates and dictates that the children
are too much for the mother and they should be given
to the father for that reason also.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THERE
WAS NOT GOOD CAUSE SHOWN TO REQUIRE THE
RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT TO A MENTAL EXAMINATION PURSUANT TO RULE 35 OF THE UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The pretrial judge listed one of the issues as
follows:
"3. Whether pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, there is sufficient
cause for the plaintiff to submit to a psychiatric examination." (Tr. 36)
The trial judge in his Memorandum Decision
stated:
"2. That there is not sufficient cause at this
time to order the plaintiff to submit to a psychiatric and physical examination. However,
the plaintiff should be closely observed, and if
it appears at some future time that a psychiatric and physical examination is necessary,
application to the court shall be immediately
made." (Tr. 46)
The appellant submits the trial judge misconceived the burden required under Rule 35 and the
apprehension he expressed about the mother's mental
condition in his memorandum decision was sufficient cause standing by itself to order the mother
to submit to a mental examination to clear up any
doubts about this issue and to determine just how
serious the mother's mental illness really was.
Rule 35 (a) states in part as follows:
" (a) In an action in which the mental condition of a party is in controversy he court in
which the action is pending may order (her)
to submit to a ... mental examination by a
disinterested and imparial physician. The
order may be made only upon motion for good
cause shown and upon notice to the party to
be examined and to all other parties and shall
specify the time, place, matter, conditions, and
scope of the examination and the person or
persons by whom it is to be made."
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The record shows that the mental competency
of the mother was the key issue in this proceedings.
(Tr. 13, 14, 36) The record also discloses that a
motion was made for a mental examination pursuant to Rule 35 (Tr. 14) and that notice was given
to the adverse party. (Tr. 15) The father agreed to
pay all cost involved. He submits that he showed
"good cause" for such an examination and that it
was prejudicial error for the trial court to deny
this examination.
The requirement of "good cause" does not mean
that the appellant must prove his case beyond a
reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the
evidence. The mother in the instant case did not
object to the pre-trial order. She did not take the
stand nor did she offer any witnesses to show why
she might be prejudiced by such an order.
In 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2559, the author
states:
"An order for physical or mental examination
(pursuant to rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which is similar to Rule 35
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) may
be made only for 'good cause shown.' However, it will usually be easy enough to make
such a showing where the physical or mental
condition of the party is actually in controversy."
In defining "good cause" in Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is for the production of documents, Professor Moore states:
"The party seeking inspection is required to
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show 'good cause thereof'. Considerations of
practical convenience should play the leading
role in determining what constitutes good
cause. What is good cause depends upon the
particular facts of each case. As Judge Mize
said in one decision, 'It is difficult to lay down
a definition of good cause and apply it to every
particular case. There is a wide latitude.' Generally speaking, however, there should be a
showing that the documents about to be inspected will in some way, aid the moving party
in the preparation of his case; the the documents are relevant to the issue; that the moving party must establish his claim or defense
by documents, most of which are in the adverse party's possession; or the denial of production would unduly prejudice the preparation of the party's case or would cause him
hardship or injustice. That production at the
trial would be cumbersome and time consuming is a reason for ordering production and
inspection under Rule 34." 4 Moore's Federal
Practice, 2449 Section 34.08, "Showing of
Good Cause."
The appellant submits that all of the tests specified above for Rule 34 were met in the instant
case. There was certainly a showing that the
mother's mental condition was in controversy. In
fact that was the key isue in this case. Her past
history of mental illness, together with a reoccurence of old symptoms which reappeared in the summer of 1965 and continued until this action was
commenced about the first of April, 1966, all emphasize the fears which the father had for his children. Just how serious the mother's mental condi31

tion was could not be known by the father nor the
neighbors he subpoenaed to court, nor by the trial
judge. It was a matter for the experts - for someone who was qualified to probe the mind and nervous systems and their relationship to the actions
of the mother.
The nature of this case precluded any direct evidency by a qualified independent psychiatrist of the
mother's mental condition because the mother claimed the doctor-patient privilege. (Tr. 199) However,
many lay witnesses including the father and the
mother's neighbors did testify to unusual symptoms
which the mother displayed as set forth above. The
father submits that there is no way other than by an
order pursuant to Rule 35 that the mother could be
compelled to submit to a mental examination to see
just how serious these symptoms were.
The appellant subpoenaed the mother's psychiatrist as a hostile witness and did solicit an opinion
suggesting that the respondent was suffering from a
mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia of a recurring nature. (Tr. 191-192) This opinion was based
on a hypothetical question which in turn was based
on facts in evidence by the lay witnesses. However
when the doctor was asked questions about his specific treatment of the mother, the doctor-patient privilege was invoked and no questions were allowed.
(Tr. 199) The appellant submits that the mother's
fear of not allowing the Doctor to testify; together
with the fear that the mother displayed at pretrial
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when her counsel objected to records of her past
mental condition being made available to the appellant, (Tr. 36 paragraph #4) is ample evidence of
the respondent's mental sickness. If she was not
apprehensive and if she thought that she was normal and was able to take care of the children she
should gladly have submitted to such an examination. The appellant testified the mother had told
him she had been advised by Doctor Tedrow her
psychiatrist to enter the LDS Hospital Psychiatric
Ward for observation and treatment just before the
present action was commenced. (Tr. 125. See also
Tr. 28. These answers to the mother's interrogatories
were made a part of the record as stated on Tr. 75,
Lines 28-et. seq. and again at Tr. 128, Lines 1718) None of this evidence was denied by the mother,
or any of the witnesses that were called by the
father.
The testimony of the lay witnesses put the
mental illness and incompetency of the mother directly into issue. The appellant testified about the
respondent's previous nervous breakdown and the reappearance of the symptoms again in the summer of
1965 and that these symptoms continued until just
a few weeks before the trial in June of 1966. (Tr.
121)
The respondent's neighbors living directly next
door and across the street testified that the respondent was mentally upset and depressed for a period
of time from about September of 1965 through April
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of 1966; although they did admit at the trial held
on June 14, that at that time the mother was acting
a little better. However they were unanimous in saying that during the intervening months she was emotionally upset, distressed, very depressed, that she
could not recognize her children, that she stated that
the oldest children were too hard for her to handle
and that they should be with their father. They also
stated that she told them that she thought that a
tape recorder had been put in her house; that the
neighbors were spying on her, that they did not like
her, and that her telephone was being tapped. The
neighbors became so concerned about this problem
that they went to the mother's bishop and asked him
to talk to her to see what could be done to straighten
out the situation in the home.
(Tr. 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164, 167,
168, 169. See also Tr. 170 where the attorney
for the mother more or less admits that the
illness persisted from September of 1965
through April of 1966. His questions always
went to having the witnesses admit that she
was a fairly good mother prior to the summer
of 1965 and after the action was started in
1966; and the appellant submits this clearly
shows the mother's own attorney admitted her
mental sickness during these intervening
months. Other references to the neighbor's
testimony are Tr. 178, 179, 180, 181, 182.
See also 183 and 184 where the neighbor states
that even when the mother began taking pills
this year for what she believed was a lowblood sugar condition that there did not seem
to be much improvement at first, but that
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during the last two months, which would have
been May and June of 1966, there was a little
improvement. In this regard, the testimony of
the mother's psychiatrist on Transcript 187189 shows conclusively that the mother was
suffering from mental illness and not a lowblood sugar condition. Again on page 198 he
states that the mother had all the symptoms
of mental illness and the only symptom which
would indicate low-blood sugar was the fatigue.)
The appellant submits that if this testimony is
not sufficient to carry the burden required by Rule
35 then it is impossible to ever use this rule for mental examinations. The appellant wonders what more
could possibly be required. He was willing to pay
all costs of the examination and any other expenses
which might be involved.
The trial judge apparently felt the respondent
should be closely watched and so stated in his memorandum decision. This clearly shows that a doubt
was raised in his mind as to the respondent's mental
condition and the appellant submits that the court
should have ordered the examination to clear up
this doubt. The appellant does not believe the approach suggested by the trial judge would help. If
the appellant did closely watch the respondent and
found her condition got worse again and made application to the court for relief, why should he expect any better treatment in the future than he
received in the instant case which would mean that
he would have to wait two to three months for dis35

covery, trial schedules, etc. before the hearing. By
that time the mother would be able to cover up her
symptoms, could talk to her neighbors, and the
father would be back where he is now.
The trial judge refused to make any specific
findings as to the testimony of the psychiatrist or
the witnesses or the neighbors as to the mother's
mental condition. His Memorandum Decision and
"Findings of Fact" are mere conclusions of law.
The appellant objected to them and made an offer
of proof as to what the psychiatrist would say if he
were permitted to testify as to his treatment of the
mother. (Tr. 62) These objections and this offer
were ignored. The appellant submits the trial court
had ample evidence to determine that the mother
was mentally ill and that she should be examined
further. This would have brought forth a fresh, independent and impartial psychiatrist. Only by so
doing could the trial judge be sure that the mother's
mental condition was not going to be injurious to
these minor children. The appellant stated in his
testimony that when the mother had her nervous
breakdown in 1960 she was not able to take care
of the house or the minor children and that he was
fearful that she could not do any better this time.
(Tr. 178-124, 131, Lines 9 et. seq.)
The appellant admits the testimony of some of
the mother's neighbors who said on cross-examination that before the summer of 1965 and after April
of 1966 the mother appeared to do better. But is this
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sufficient? Is a lucid interval for a few months out of
a year enough or is the job of raising four children
a 24 hour a day task which requires rationality seven
days a week as a minimum. Is a mother that can't
even recognize her own children a good mother? Can
one who sits and stares and is so depressed that she
can't take care of her house or properly feed and
clothe her children competent to have their custody?
Suppose that a further mental examination disclosed a more serious mental illness than even Dr.
Tedrow was able to diagnose from the hypothetical
question. Wouldn't it be better to alleviate these
doubts and to clear the air once and for all by a
mental examination now.
Other courts have faced this same problem and
have even gone so far as to deny the mother not only
custody of the children but visitation rights as well.
In Bowler v. Bowler, 355 Michigan 686, 96 N.W.
2d 129 (1959) the court had before it the father's
motion to modify the original divorce decree and to
grant the custody of the children to him on the
grounds that the mother had become afflicted with
a serious mental illness. The testimony of three psychiatrists at the hearing was in favor of the father's
position and based thereon the court upheld the
change of custody and also denied the mother reasonable visitation rights notwithstanding she had
her friends and neighbors there to testify as to her
good motherly qualities. In this connection the court
said:
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"The second ground, as we followed it is that
the court erred in granting custody to the
father where there was disputed medical testimony. To thus badly state the question is
to answer it. We are aware of no rule of law
nor are we cited one, that ties the hands of
a chancellor because of disputed medical testimony. If we did know of any such rule, we
would promptly write to overrule it. Opposed
testimony of friends and former neighbors apparently also depended upon by appellant, (as
to their past observations as to the kindliness
and maternal attributes and good character of
Mrs. Bowler) however important in the usual
case, were of but passing moment in the particular circumstances of this case. These attributes were not disputed nor in issue and, if
anything, only tend to make this case more
pitiable. The raising of young children is a
24 hour proposition, 7 days a week, year in
and year out, and in these situations passing
observations of lay witnesses made during the
subjects' s lucid intervals (apparently one of
the strange phenomenon of this grave mental
sickness) may not challenge the clear, careful,
and detached testinwny of three reputable psychiatrists. The chancellor below himself made
it plain that if it were not for the mother's
mental state, he would gladly and without
hesitation have restored her to actual as well
as legal custody of the children." (Page 132
of Court's Opinion. Emphasis added)
In the Bowler case the psychiatrists stated that Mrs.
Bowler was suffering "from a grave mental illness
which they more or less uniformly diagnosed as schizophrenia, paranoid type, chronic active." At least
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two of them felt that she should be in a mental institution. One of the doctors told the court of the
devastating effect that exposure of growing children
to such an afflicted parent could have on the children not only in the present, but in the unpredictable
future. Another testified that 'it is never in the best
interests of anyone to be in the custody of somebody
who is nientally ill;' and one medical witness who
appears to have seen the mother most recently flatly
recommended against granting the mother visitation for her sake as well as the childrens. (Page 131
of the opinion)
The appellant submits that the Bowler casels
on all 4's with the instant case. In the instant case
the psychiatrist testified that the mother was suffering from a mental illness diagnosed as schizophrenia, and said that it was of a recurring or
active nature. He stated that there were many different things that could happen around the house
to trigger a schizophrenic episode such as emotional
problems, responsibility of raising four children
without the help of the father, etc. (Tr. 196) The
testimony is undisputed that this doctor recommended that the mother be hospitalized in the psychiatric ward of the LDS hospital for further examination. (Tr. 125) The defendant submits that
in addition to the schizophrenic tendancies mentioned by Dr. Tedrow that the mother's anxiety about
being persecuted by her neighbors so much and that
she felt a tape recorder was implanted in the back
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of her head and in the house and that she had moved
from a former residence and had also had her telephone disconnected and the number changed because she thought that the neighbors were spying
on her suggests a paranoid illness also. Under these
circumstances, it might well be the opinion of a disinterested psychiatrist that not only should the custody of the children be taken from their mother
and be given to their father but also that the mother
should be deprived of ever exposing her mental illness to the children again; and forbidden from any
future visitation rights in accordance with the opinion set forth in the Bowler v. Bowler case.
The appellant submits that this evidence amply
discloses that "good cause" has been shown to require the respondent to submit to a mental examination. The appellant also suggests to the court that
sufficient evidence has been shown upon which this
court could make an outright change in the custody
of the minor children based on the mental incompetency of the mother without remanding this matter
for a further examination or a new trial.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THA'T THE RESPONDENT IS NOT MENTALLY INCOMPETENT TO
TAKE CARE OF THE FOUR MINOR CHILDREN AND
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT OTHERWISE UNFIT TO TAKE CARE OF THEM IS CONTRARY TO
THE OVERWHELMING WEI'GHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
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The trial judge stated in his memorandum
decision as follows:
"l. That the plaintiff is not mentally incompetent to take care of the minor children, nor
is the plaintiff otherwise unfit to take care
of them." (Tr. 46)
The defendant submits there was ample uncontroverted evidence to sustain the finding that the
mother was mentally incompetent and refers this
court to the evidence cited above under the next
preceding argument point. The appellant submits
that the evidence he produced was not only sufficient to carry the burden of good cause pursuant to
Rule 35 for a further mental examination, but that
it was also sufficient for the trial judge to make an
outright award of the custody of the four minor
children to the defendant.
In addition to the respondent's mental incompetency, the appellant submits that there was also
uncon troverted evidence of neglect of the physical
well-being of the minor children; of a defeatist attitude toward disciplining the two oldest boys; of afavori tism towards the two youngest children ; as well
as derogatory statements about the appellant made
by the respondent and/or third parties in the respondent's presence and also which were made in
the presence of the minor children. These derogatory statements became very upsetting to the children as expressed by them in the record. All of these
points were raised by the father in his motion for
the change of custody of the children. (Tr. 13)
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In the case of Harris v. Harris, 186 Cal. 2d 788,
9 Cal Reporter, 300 ( 1960) the California Supreme
Court stated:
"In modifying a child custody award it was
proper for the court to consider, besides the
obvious condition of the household maintained
by the mother, the family relations, financial
condition of the parents, and the ages of the
children, the whole background of the children and of the parents and any other factors
bearing on the welfare of the children, such
as the mother's lack of interest in them and
her lack of devotion and concern for their
welfare, neglect of, insufficient facilities and
the inability to care for the children, hostility
of the mother towards the father and her refusal to allow him to express an interest in
them, and her incapability of exercising necessary discipline, supervision and control over
the children, and her deliberate estrangement
of them from their father, the home atmosphere and the available superior care of one
parent and the educational needs of the children."
The record discloses that the mother made derogatory statements about the father and that none
of this testimony was objected to or controverted
by the mother. The appellant testified that immediately before this proceeding was commenced he
returned to the respondent's home with the minor
children from a Saturday visitation session. At that
time the mother exhibited hostility toward the father
in the presence of the mmor children and jerked
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them out of the car and told the father that he
couldn't see them anymore on Wednesday which had
been a visitation day for the past two years. The
mother further stated that he might not be able to
see them again on Saturday. (Tr. 109).
That night, the mother asked her bishop's wife
to her home where in the presence of the mother and
the minor children, the bishop's wife made derogatory statements about the father and his present
wife. The minor child Randall was so upset by this
that he called his father the next day and stated
to him what had occurred. The father's testimony in
this regard is as follows:
"Q

Did they say anything later to you about
that?

A

Yes sir, let me see, well the Saturday
after this happened, my oldest son, Randall, he called me Sunday afternoon, and
he said that after I brought them home
the previous Saturday that his mother
had called the bishop's wife and she came
down and she was just telling them all
kinds of bad things about myself and
about Lynell.

Q

Is Randy your oldest son?

A

Yes.

Q What did he say had been said?
A

He said that the bishop's wife had just
called Lynell in so many - she said she
was just a bad woman, and you see the
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bishop's wife had never even met Lynell
before previously.
Q

Did he say anything else had been said
at that time?

A

He kind of inferred, she just said all
kinds of bad things.

Q

Did he seem upset?

A

Yes, he was. He was extremely upset.

Q

What did you tell him?

A

I told him, 'Randall you are twelve years
old, you are a big boy. You know some
of these things that have been said.' I
said, 'you know Lynell and you know
what type of person she is.' I said, 'I
can't be with you to explain to you too
much about the situation, but you are
going to have to just kind of make up
your own mind as to what to believe and
what you are not going to believe.' (Tr.
110)

When the trial judge asked Randall if his
mother had ever said anything bad about his father,
he replied in the affirmative stating:
"Q
A
Q

A
Q

(By the court) What does your mother
ever tell you about your father? Does she
ever talk about him?
(By Randall) She thinks he is a brat.
Is that what she said he was?
She cusses at him.
What does she say bad about your father?
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A

When Tommy and Bret were riding down
the street on a bicycle, my mommy couldn't find them, and she sat down and cried
and started swearing at him.

Q Swearing at whom?
A
Q

My dad.
Was this before they were separated?

A

After." (Tr. 211)

Obviously this kind of talk is something that
the minor children should not be subjected to. The
mother's mental illness was exposed when she sat
down and cried and swore at the father over a relatively isimple matter. This episode obviously stuck
in the boy's mind. The appellant submits the mother's
open hostility is very upsetting to these children
and that it is going to poison their minds not only
to their father, but perhaps will give them an improper prospective toward men in general and certainly toward the family as a unit. For these reasons
the courts uniformly hold that the custody should
be taken from the parent making the derogatory
statements and be granted to the other. 32 ALR
1005 "Alienation of Child's Affections as Affecting
Custody Award."
In addition to the derogatory statements, the
i-ecord shows that the respondent was not able to
handle the oldest children and had admitted to neighbors that they would probably be better off with
their father and that they had also expressed a
45

desire to be with their father. (Tr. 126, 152, 181,
182) This evidence was not denied by the mother.
l\1oreover the evidence shows the mother favored
the two younger twin boys (Tr. 127, 168) and this
is another reason why the custody of at least the
two older boys should be granted to the father.
Finally the record shows that the mother
neglected even giving the children the bare necessities of life. The father testified that when he would
pick the children up at 9 :30 on Saturdays for visitation they were frequently unfed and were almost
always in dirty clothes. (Tr. 79-80, 111, 118) Not
only were their clothes dirty, but their bodies also
and sometimes this dirt produced an awful stench.
(Tr. 103, 118, 204) A friend of the father's wife
testified that she was present at the father's house
on several of the Saturday visitations and that the
children "were very very dirty. Their clothes were
dirty, their faces and hands were dirty and they
looked terrible." She stated that the father and his
present wife had to take the children in and to wash
them and clean them before they would be ready for
breakfast. (Tr. 204)
None of this evidence was disputed by the
mother. It is true that some of he neighbors stated
on cross examination that at the time of the trial
the mother was doing a better job of taking care of
the children than she had done previously. However
all of them admitted that while she had been "sick",
"upset", and "depressed", (which was from the sum46

mer of 1965 through April 1966) she had not been
able to do the job of taking care of the children as
they thought she should. In fact the neighbors became
so alarmed that at one time a group of them went
to the bishop to ask him to talk to the mother to see
if there wasn't something that could be done in taking care of the children and cleaning up the house.
(Tr. 152, 153, 156, 157, 157, 163, 164, 167, 168,
169, 178-182)
The appellant submits that all of the factors
set forth in the Harris case, supra, are present in
this case and that each of them dictate against the
trial judge awarding the custody of the minor children to their mother. It was clear that the father's
financial situation and home and environment was
much better for the children than was the mothers.
The mother stipuated that both the father and his
present wife were fit persons in all repsects to have
the custody of the children. (Tr. 202, Lines 20-22)
The father had remarried and his present wife had
three children about the same ages as the four that
were involved in the instant case. Both he and his
present wife were working and were thus able to
financially take care of the seven children. All seven
children would have been in school so it was not
necessary for anybody to be home during the day
to take care of them. However, the father's mother
lives just a few houses away and could have come
down in any emergency. On the other hand, the record discloses that the mother was mentally ill, that
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she was upset and depressed all the time and that the
people in the neighborhood did not think that she
was doing too good a job of taking care of the
children. It is uncontroverted that the two oldest
boys were becoming a discipline problem for her and
that she stated that she thought they should be with
their father.
IV.
THE TRIAL COUR'T ERRED IN AWARDING THE
FATHER SUCH LIMITED VISITATION RIGHTS AND
IT ALSO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE MOTHER
TO BE IN CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO AWARD
THE FATHER REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS.

In his memorandum decision the trial judge
stated:
"3. That the plaintiff is not in contempt of
the decree of divorce heretofore entered for
her failure to allow the defendant visitation
rights which he had prior to the filing of the
petition:" (Tr. 46)
The trial court then amended his memorandum
decision and added the following visitation rights:
"It is ordered that the defendant is allowed
to have the children Friday after school until
Saturday night every other weekend, and s~all
have the right to visit with them in addit10n
thereto at times convenient to the children and
the parties. Further the defendant may have
the children with him for a period of at least
two weeks during the summer when the ?efendant has his vacation, and if the vacat10n
is more than two weeks, he may have th~m
with him during that period, during which
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the defendant will be relieved proport10nately of the amount of support he is ordered to pay. However, this relief on the support only extends to summer vacation." (Tr.
51)
From the time of the divorce decree in July,
1964, the parties had agreed that the father would
take the children to his house every Wednesday
night and also on Saturdays from about 9 :30 a.m.
to 7 :30 p.m. (Tr. 107) This constituted reasonable
visitation rights for the parties. Even then, the
children stated to the trial judge that they would
like to see their father more often in the future than
they had in the past. (Tr. 210, 21 7) . However, the
trial judge actually cut these visitation rights in
half. There were no findings stated in the court's
memorandum decision or "Findings of Fact" to support this action and the appellant submits that it is
prejudicial error.
The appellant had always paid his $240.00 per
month alimony and child support right on time each
and every month. (Tr. 108, Lines 1-11) He had also
assisted his exwife in taking the children at times
when she was unable to handle them and had helped
out around the house and yard. (Tr. 108, 175) Yet,
in spite of all this assistance and showing of good
faith on the part of the father, the trial court actually penalized him and has taken the children away
from him, notwithstanding their express desires to
be with their father more and the two oldest children
having stated that they wanted to come and live with
t~me
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him. And this was done notwithstanding the stipulation that the appellant and his present wife were fit
and proper persons in all respects to have the custody of the children awarded to them. (Tr. 202)
The appellant submits that the mother's action
in refusing to let him see his children on W ednesdays was merely a punishment for commencing this
lawsuit and did not promote the welfare of the minor
children in any way. It is undisputed that the parties agreed to visitation every Wednesday night for
two years and that the father had always taken the
children on these occasions. Certainly this had become reasonable visitation rights pursuant to the
terms of the divorce decree. The record discloses that
the mother was angry because the father was about to
commence this action and that this anger prompted
her actions denying the father Wednesday visitation
rights. (Tr. 109) The mother did not offer any
other reason for her action and the appellant submits that the trial judge should have found her in
contempt of court for her failure to award the father
reasonable visitation rights as ordered in the divorce
decree, and as agreed upon by the parties for two
years.

v.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO
MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS MATTER.

Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part as follows:
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"If the court renders judgment on the merits
against the plaintiff the court shall make
findings as provided in Rule 52 (a)."
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part as follows:

"In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury, ... the court shall, unless the same are
waived, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereof and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment;

"

There was no waiver of any kind of the Findings of Fact in this matter, and the trial judge refused to make any specific findings after the father
requested them. After the proposed findings had
been submitted by the mother's attorney, the father
objected specifically to the findings and asked the
court to make new findings concerning the welfare
of the minor children pursuant to the evidence which
had been produced. (Tr. 60-63) This the trial judge
ref used to do.
This court has held that in a divorce case where
the case is tried to the court, there should be specific
and direct findings of all of the facts. Doe v. Doe,
48 Utah 200, 158 Pacific 781 (1916). All of the cases
following Rule 52 in the Utah Code Annotated show
that Conclusions of Law alone are not sufficient
and that it is a reversible error for the court to
enter judgment which is not based upon adequate
findings of fact as to each and every material matter which is in issue.
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The trial judge entered his memorandum decision on June 16, 1966. (Tr. 46-47) Based thereon, :
counsel for the mother prepared some proposed i
"Findings of Fact", "Conclusions of Law", and a
"Decree" (Tr. 54-59). These were objected to by '
the appellant on several grounds but the court dismissed these objections and signed the findings on
July 13, 1966.
The appellant requests this honorable court to
read these "findings." The appellant submits that
they are merely a restatement of the conclusions
of law which were stated by the court in its memorandum decision and that the conclusions of law
and decree are also simply a restatement of these
same points.
The appellant submits that the only proper finding is contained in the first part of paragraph 4
which states the children expressed a desire to be
with their father (Tr. 55); but even then the court
went on to overrule its own "findings" and award
custody to the mother.
If this court will read the "findings" it will

find that there is not one specific fact found anywhere other than that the children have expressed
a desire to be with their father. No testimony of any
witnesses is referred to nor are any other parts
of the evidence cited. There is nowhere any finding
as to what is best for the welfare of the minor
children. The appellant submits these "findings"
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which are really conclusions are not supported by
the evidence for the reasons set forth above in this
brief, and that these "conclusions" are contrary to
the law and to the evidence for the reasons set forth
above.
SUMMARY

In summary the appellant submits the record
in this case to this honorable court for study. The
record shows that the appellant has been an excellent father to the four minor children herein; that
he has consistently each month paid the $240.00
alimony and child support ordered by the court; that
he has helped out on other circumstances and occasions with the minor children and around the house;
that he has remarried and that his present wife
has three children of her own and their ages are
about the same as the four children involved in the
instant action; that both he and his present wife
are fit and proper persons to have the custody of
the minor children; that they are financially and are
in all respects better able to take care of the four
children than is the respondent; that the two oldest
children have expressed a desire to live with their
father rather than remain with their mother; that
this decision is their considered judgment; that the
mother has said that these two oldest children were
too much for her to handle and that they should
be with their father and that they have expressed
their desire to be with the father - this she has
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told to her neighbors as well as to other people;
that the mother is suffering from a severe mental
illness called schizophrenia of an active reoccurring
nature and possibly a more serious illness; that for
longer than six months she exhibited several symptoms of this mental illness; that she makes derogatory statements about the father and the father's
present wife to the said minor children; that she
neglects to provide the said minor children with the
necessities of life and that she has denied the father
the right to see his children in the future as he
has been seeing them in the past. Under these circumstances the appellant respectfully submits the
trial judge erred and did not listen to the evidence
and weigh it, but rather had his mind made up
about the case to the prejudice of the father's rights,
and certainly to the detriment of the minor children.
The father submits that he is entitled to the
custody of the four children as a matter of law
from the record herein and further submits that
the case should be remanded for the trial judge to
make new findings and accurate conclusions of law
granting custody of all four children to the appellant for the reasons set forth above.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES A. McINTOSH
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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I acknowledge receipt of two copies of the
Appellant's Brief this ---------------- day of November,
1966.
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